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This note provides a new proof of the non{emptiness of the fuzzy core in a pure
exchange economy with ¯nitely many agents. The proof is based on the concept of
(¦;¯){balanced core for games without side payments due to Bonnisseau and Iehl¶ e
(2003).
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11 Introduction
The fuzzy core was introduced by Aubin (1979) as the set of allocations of a pure exchange
economy that are robust to blockings by all fuzzy coalitions. To interpret a fuzzy coalition,
one thinks of an economy as being comprised of several types of agents, with each type
being represented by a continuum of identical individuals. The fuzzy coalition then speci¯es
the number (the mass) of the participants of each type.
The fuzzy core is known to be non{empty under very general conditions. In partic-
ular, Florenzano (2003) establishes the non{emptiness of the fuzzy core in an in¯nite{
dimensional production economy (see Proposition 5.2.3, page 115).
This note provides a new proof of the non{emptiness of the fuzzy core. The proof
is based on the concept of the (¦;¯){balanced core for games without side payments,
a special case of the so{called core with additional requirements introduced recently in
Bonnisseau and Iehl¶ e (2003). A given economy gives rise to a non{transferable utility
game whose (¦;¯){balanced core corresponds, in a natural way, to the ²{fuzzy core of
the original economy. The non{emptiness of the fuzzy core can therefore be deduced from
the non{emptiness result for the (¦;¯){balanced core provided in Bonnisseau and Iehl¶ e
(2003).
Our non{emptiness result is weaker than that provided by Proposition 5.2.3 in Floren-
zano (2003). The result in Florenzano (2003) applies to an economy with a non{trivial
production sector, while our construction is limited to pure exchange economies. Fur-
thermore, to transform the problem of the non{emptiness of the fuzzy core into that of
the non{emptiness of the (¦;¯){balanced core, we have to rely on the existence of the
utility functions. This is in contrast to the result in Florenzano (2003), where the con-
sumer preferences may lack completeness or transitivity. On the other hand, we are able
to maintain quite general assumptions with respect to the commodity space of an econ-
omy. As in Florenzano (2003), the commodity space in this paper is a general (possibly
in¯nite{dimensional) linear Hausdor® topological space.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some notation is introduced.
In Section 3 the fuzzy core and the ²{fuzzy core are de¯ned. In Section 4 some preliminary
results are presented, including the non{emptiness result for the (¦;¯){balanced core. In
Section 5 the non{emptiness of the ²{fuzzy core is demonstrated.
2 Notation
Let n be a positive integer. Then N is the set of integers f1;:::;ng, and N is the collection
of non{empty subsets of the set N. Rn is the space of functions x : i 2 N 7! xi 2 R.
RN is the space of functions ¸ : S 2 N 7! ¸S 2 R. Given S 2 N , de¯ne the set
¢S = f¼S 2 Rn j¼i
S = 0 for all i 2 NnS;
P
i2S ¼i
S = 1g. Given an ² 2 (0;1=n), let
¢²
S = f¼S 2 ¢S j¼i
S ¸ ² for all i 2 Sg. Let ¯ denote the barycenter of ¢N. For a subset
A of Rn, the symbols intA, @A, and coA denote, respectively, the interior, the boundary,
and the convex hull of A.
23 Fuzzy core
We consider a pure exchange economy E in which the set of agents is N, and the commodity
space is C. Each agent i 2 N is characterized by a consumption set Xi µ C, initial
endowment of commodities ei 2 C, and a utility function ui : Xi ! R. Given S 2 N we
write XS to denote the product £
i2S
Xi.
We employ the following assumptions:
(A1) The commodity space C is a linear (over the ¯eld of real numbers) Hausdor® topo-
logical space.
(A2) For each i 2 N, the set Xi is a closed convex set containing ei, and the set F(E) = ©





of feasible commodity allocations is a compact set.
(A3) For each i 2 N the utility function ui is a continuous and quasi{concave function.
De¯nition 1 An allocation x 2 F(E) is an element of the fuzzy core Cf(E) of the economy





ui(Âi) > ui(xi) for all i 2 N with ¼i > 0.
It is instrumental to consider the following modi¯cation of the fuzzy core, called the ²{fuzzy
core. In the ²{fuzzy core it is required that for any fuzzy coalition ¼ with support S the
mass ¼i of the participants of each type i 2 S be at least ² > 0.
De¯nition 2 An allocation x 2 F(E) is an element of the ²{fuzzy core Cf
² (E) of the
economy E if there exist no S µ N, no ¼ 2 ¢²
S and no Â 2 XS such that
P
i2S ¼iÂi = P
i2S ¼iei and ui(Âi) > ui(xi) for all i 2 S.
Theorem 1 For each ² 2 (0;1=n), the ²{fuzzy core of the economy E is non{empty.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given Section 5. Our main result is the following.
Theorem 2 The fuzzy core of the economy E is non{empty.
Proof. To prove Theorem 2 we consider fuzzy core as a limit of the ²{fuzzy core as ²
approaches zero. Observe that Cf
² (E) µ C
f
²0(E) whenever 0 < ² · ²0. Moreover, the fuzzy








Since the non{emptiness of the ²{fuzzy core follows from Theorem 1, it su±ces to demon-
strate that Cf
² (E) is a compact set. We show that it is a closed subset of F(E).
Let x be a point of F(E) not in Cf
² (E). Then there exist S µ N, ¼ 2 ¢²
S and Â 2 XS
as in De¯nition 2. For a ¯xed Â, the inequalities ui(Âi) > ui(xi), i 2 S, de¯ne an open
neighborhood of x in F(E) contained entirely in the complement of Cf
² (E). Thus, the
complement of Cf
² (E) in F(E) is an open set, as desired.
34 (¦;¯){Balanced core
An n{person game with non-transferable utility (hereafter referred to simply as a game)
is a family of sets V = hV (S)iS2N satisfying the following assumptions. For all S 2 N
(G1) V (S) is a non{empty closed subset of Rn.
(G2) [v 2 V (S); ¹ v 2 Rn; ¹ vi · vi for all i 2 S] implies [¹ v 2 V (S)].
(G3) There is a number M such that vi · M for all i 2 S and v 2 V (S).
The core of the game V is a set of Rn given by





Given v 2 Rn, let S(v) = fS 2 N jv 2 @V (S)g.
The (¦;¯){balanced core is a special case of the so{called core with additional require-
ments for games with non-transferable utility introduced in Bonnisseau and Iehl¶ e (2003).
The (¦;¯){balanced core generalizes the idea of the socially stable core for socially struc-
tured games in Herings et al (2003).
De¯nition 3 Let V be a game. For each S 2 N let ¦S : @V (S) ! ¢S be a cor-
respondence with non{empty convex values and with a closed graph. Then the (¦;¯){
balanced core of the game V is the set of points v in the core of V such that ¯ 2
cof¦S(v) j S 2 S(v)g:
Thus the (¦;¯){balanced core is a selection from the core. If the correspondence ¦N is
constant and maps each v into the one{point set f¯g, then the (¦;¯){balanced core of V
coincides with the core of V .
The (¦;¯){balancedness condition for games without side payments belongs to the
class of payo®{dependent balancedness conditions studied in Bonnisseau and Iehl¶ e (2003).
A related reference is Predtetchinski and Herings (2003), where the payo®{dependent bal-
ancedness was shown to be a necessary and su±cient condition for the non{emptiness of
the core.
De¯nition 4 Let V be a game. For each S 2 N let ¦S : @V (S) ! ¢S be a correspon-
dence with non{empty convex values and with a closed graph. The game V is said to be
(¦;¯){balanced provided that the following condition is satis¯ed: if v 2 Rn is such that
¯ 2 cof¦S(v) j S 2 S(v)g, then v 2 V (N).
For the proof of Theorem 3 the reader is referred to Bonnisseau and Iehl¶ e (2003).
Theorem 3 Let V be a game. For each S 2 N let ¦S : @V (S) ! ¢S be a correspondence
with non{empty convex values and with a closed graph. Suppose that the game V is (¦;¯){
balanced. Then the (¦;¯){balanced core of the game V is non{empty.
45 The non{emptiness of the ²{fuzzy core
Let an ² 2 (0;1=n) and an economy E be given. We construct a non{transferable utility
game V ² and the correspondences ¦S in such a way that the (¦;¯){balanced core of the
game V ² corresponds, in a natural way, to the ²{fuzzy core of the economy E. In the game
V ², the utility tuple v is considered feasible for a coalition S if it is feasible for some fuzzy
coalition ¼S with support S in the original eocnomy E. Given the vector of utilities v in
@V ²(S), we let ¦S(v) to consist of those fuzzy coalitions ¼S that can achieve the utility
of v. We then show that the the game V ² is (¦;¯){balanced and that its (¦;¯){balanced
core corresponds, under the utility functions, to the ²{fuzzy core of the economy E.


































there exists (xS;¼S) 2 Z²(S) such that
ui(xi
S) ¸ vi for all i 2 S
)
: (2)
Proposition 1 For each ² 2 (0;1=n), Z²(S) is a non{empty and compact set.
Proof. For each ² 2 (0;1=n), the set ¢²
S is non{empty, and Z²(S) contains a non{empty
subset feSg £ ¢²
S, where ei
S = ei for all i 2 S. De¯ne FS(E) to be the set of feasible


















First we argue that FS(E) is a compact set. The set FN(E) is compact by assumption




x 2 X j x
i = e
i for all i 2 NnS
ª
:
By assumption (A2), C is a Hausdor® space, so a one{point set feig is closed in Xi for
each i. It follows that FS(E) is closed in FN(E); therefore, it is a compact set.
To see that Z²(S) is a compact set, let jSj be the cardinality of S; let CjSj be the
jSj{fold product of C, and let ' be a continuous function from the space CjSj £ ¢²
S to


















for each i 2 S. Then
Z







The product of the compact sets FS(E) and ¢²
S is a compact set, and so is its image under
'. Thus Z²(S) is a closed subset of a compact set; therefore, it is a compact set.
5Proposition 2 For each ² 2 (0;1=n), the family of sets V ² = hV ²(S)iS2N satis¯es condi-
tions (G1){(G3).
Proof. Condition (G2) is satis¯ed by de¯nition of V ²(S). To verify conditions (G1) and











there exists _ v 2 _ V ²(S) such that
_ vi ¸ vi for all i 2 S
)
;











there exists (xS;¼S) 2 Z²(S) such that
ui(xi
S) = vi for all i 2 S
)
:
The set _ V ²(S) is the image of the set Z²(S) under the composition of the maps
XS £ ¢²
S XS RS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
where the ¯rst map is the natural projection, and the second map is a Cartesian product
of the functions ui for i 2 S. It follows that _ V ²(S) is a non{empty compact subset of RS;
in particular, it is bounded from above. From this one can easily see that the set V ²(S)
satis¯es conditions (G1) and (G3).
We remark that for ² = 0 the family of sets V ² may fail to meet conditions (G1) and (G3),
since Z0(N) is not, generally, a compact set. It is to avoid this di±culty that the ²{fuzzy
cores and the corresponding games V ² were introduced.
De¯ne the correspondences ¦S : @V ²(S) ! ¢²



























Proposition 3 For each v 2 @V ²(S) the set ¦S(v) is non{empty and convex. The corre-
spondence ¦S has a closed graph.
Proof. The set ¦S(v) is non{empty by de¯nition of V ²(S). To prove that it is a convex
set, let ¼S;¼0
S 2 ¦S(v) and t 2 [0;1] be given. We must show that e ¼S = t¼S + (1 ¡ t)¼0
S
is an element ¦S(v). Let xS, x0









S) ¸ vi for all i 2 S, and similarly for x0
S. Given i 2 S let e xi
















6By convexity of the consumption sets one has e xi
S 2 Xi. By quasi{concavity of the utility
function, ui(e xi










































Thus, e ¼S 2 ¦S(v), as desired.












there exists (_ v;¼S) 2 _ G
such that _ vi ¸ vi for all i 2 S
)
;














there exists xS 2 XS such that
(xS;¼S) 2 Z²(S)
ui(xi





Then the set _ G is the image of Z²(S) under the continuous map XS £ ¢²
S ! RS £ ¢²
S,
which is a Cartesian product of the utility functions ui for i 2 S and the identity map on
¢²
S. It follows from Proposition 1 that _ G is a compact set. From this one can easily see
that the set G is closed in @V ²(S) £ ¢²
S.
Theorem 4 Let the game V ² and the correspondences ¦S : @V ²(S) ! ¢²
S be de¯ned by
Equations 1{3. Let an allocation x be an element of the ²{fuzzy core of the economy E.
Then the utility tuple v is an element of the (¦;¯){balanced core of the game V ², where
vi = ui(xi) for all i 2 N. Conversely, let the utility tuple v be an element of the (¦;¯){
balanced core of the game V ². Then there exists a commodity allocation x in the ²{fuzzy
core of the economy E such that vi ¸ ui(xi) for all i 2 N.
Proof. Let the commodity allocation x be in the ²{fuzzy core of the economy E. Let
v 2 Rn be given by vi = ui(xi) for all i 2 N. It is clear that v is in the core of the game V ².
Since we have the inclusion ¯ 2 ¦N(v), the vector of utilities v is in the (¦;¯){balanced
core of V ².
Conversely, let the vector of utilities v be in the (¦;¯){balanced core of the game V ².












S for all i 2 N:
It follows from the de¯nition of the game V ² (Equations 1 and 2) that for every S 2 S(v)















S) ¸ vi for all i 2 S:












The consumption vector ¹ xi
N is a weighted average of the vectors xi
S over those coalitions
S 2 S(v) that contain player i. By convexity of the consumption sets, ¹ xi
N is an element of




































We see that the allocation ¹ xN is an element of the set F(E). Since v is not an interior point
of any set V ²(S), the allocation ¹ xN is robust to deviations by fuzzy coalitions ¼S 2 ¢²
S for
all S 2 N . Thus, ¹ xN is in the ²{fuzzy core of the economy E.
Theorem 5 The game V ² is (¦;¯){balanced.
We omit the proof of this theorem as it is similar to the proof of Theorem 4. Theorem 5
implies that the (¦;¯){balanced core of the game V ² is non{empty. Our argument is now
complete.
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